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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Appellee,

:

vs.

:

Case No. 950408-CA

ROLANDO CALEB BECKER

:

Priority No. 2

Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from convictions of theft, a second degree
felony, evidence tampering, a second degree felony, possession of
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and escape by a prisoner, a class
B misdemeanor, rendered by Judge Anthony Schofield, in the Fourth
District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah.

Utah Code

Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) ( 1995 Supp. to Replacement Volume 9)
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire?
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court's performance of
jury voir dire with the abuse of discretion standard of review.
1

State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992).

"Whether

a trial court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire depends
on whether, 'considering the totality of the questioning, counsel
was afforded an adequate opportunity to acquire the information
necessary to evaluate

[prospective] jurors.,"

Id.

(citation

omitted; brackets by the Court).
The trial court' s failure to grant one challenge for cause was
properly preserved by the challenge for cause (R. 116, 122, 128).
The adequacy of the voir dire on juror relationships with witnesses
and

juror

preserved.

experiences

with

similar

crimes

was

not properly

Therefore, this Court must assess this aspect of the

adequacy of the voir dire under the ineffective assistance of
counsel and plain error doctrines.

State v. Ellifritzf 835 P.2d

170 (Utah App. 1992) .
2. Did the triai court err in denying Mr. Becker's motion to
suppress all evidence seized as a result of illegalities occurring
during the traffic stop?
This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, the
factual aspects of which the Court reviews with some deference, and
the iegal conclusions of which the Court reviews for correctness.
See State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995 (Utah App.), affirmed, 268 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995).
This issue was properly preserved by the pretrial motion to
suppress (R. 173 ).
3. Did the trial court err in refusing Mr. Becker's lesser
included offense instruction?
2

This issue presents a question of law, to be reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Simpson. 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah

App. 1995).
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsel' s request
for the instruction and objection to the trial court' s failure to
give it (R. 120, 212; T. 339, 341).
4. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence concerning
Trooper Mangelson' s assumptions the contents of the paper bag taken
from the scene of the traffic stop by Mr. Becker?
The standard of review for this type of issue is somewhat
deferential.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).

This issue was properly preserved by the motion in limine
filed by Mr. Means (R. 127-128).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are
included in Appendix 1 to this brief:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1311
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1314
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-402
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-401
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18
Utah Rule of Evidence 401
Utah Rule of Evidence 402
Utah Rule of Evidence 403
Utah Rule of Evidence 702.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Becker was charged by information dated and filed October
8, 1993, with one count of theft of a vehicle, a second degree
felony, one count of

evidence tampering, a second degree felony,

possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor,

and escape by a

prisoner, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1).
The Honorable Anthony Schofield appointed Milton T. Harmon to
represent Mr. Becker at the time of Mr. Becker' s arraignment on
October 19, 1993 (R. 2).
At the preliminary hearing, on November 3, 1993, Magistrate
Schofield ordered Mr. Becker bound over as charged, accepted Mr.
Becker' s pleas of not guilty on behalf of the district court, and
ordered counsel to obtain and trial date and inform Mr. Becker (R.
6, 8; P.H. 39).
At the pretrial conference on June 3, 1994, District Court
Judge Park appointed Thomas Means to represent Mr. Becker, after
extensive conflicts arose between Mr. Becker and previous counsel
(R. 117).
The jury convicted Mr. Becker as he was charged (R. 219-222).
The minute entry for November 22, 1994, indicates Mr. Means'
motion to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Becker because of Mr.
Becker's lack of confidence in him (R. 228). The court denied the
motion, but indicated an intention to reconsider the motion after
sentencing (R. 228).
Mr. Means filed a motion to reduce the degree of offenses (R.
229-231).
4

On June 2, 1995, Judge Anthony Schofield sentenced Mr. Becker
to maximum sentences and fines on the second degree felonies, and
to maximum sentences on the misdemeanors, with all sentences to run
concurrently (R. 302).

The judge suspended the sentences and

placed Mr. Becker on probation, a condition of which was his
service of 90 days in jail (R. 302).
On June 8, 1995, Mr. Means filed his withdrawal of counsel and
the notice of appeal on Mr. Becker's behalf (R. 297-300).

Douglas

Neeley .entered his appearance of counsel on July 6, 1995 (R. 309).
On September 1, 1995, Thomas Means filed a motion for a
certificate of probable
321).

cause and supporting memorandum

(R. 316-

Mr. Neeley filed a request for a ruling (R. 322-323).

The

trial court denied the motion for a certificate of probable cause
(R. 325).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATE' S CASE IN CHIEF
On October 7, 1993, near Nephi in Juab County, Trooper
Mangelson stopped a car for speeding at the rate of 76 miles per
hour in a 65 mile an hour zone at about 11:45 a.m. (T. 154, 168).
Mangelson' s car was normally equipped with a video camera, but it
was unavailable

during the events of this case (T. 174-175).

Mr. Becker was a passenger in the front seat; Michael Wilson
was a passenger in the back seat; and Lisa La Barrie was the driver
(T. 154-155, 161). The car had California plates (T. 155).
Upon stopping the car, Mangelson informed Ms. La Barrie about
the speeding and requested her identification and registration (T.
5

156). She produced a New Mexico driver' s license from the trunk of
the car, and a rental agreement for the car (T. 156).

Ms. La

Barrie was properly licensed and the car was properly registered
(T. 183). Mangelson was suspicious because the car had been rented
by someone named Wilson, and Ms. La Barrie explained that Mr.
Becker' s girlfriend had rented the car because she had a credit
card (T. 157). Mr. Becker was listed on the rental agreement as an
additional driver (T. 157).

Mangelson asked Wilson for his

identification to investigate whether Mr. Wilson was related to the
woman who had rented the car, as indicated by Lisa La Barrie

(T.

181-182). Mangelson obtained Mr. Becker's license to confirm that
the information listed on the rental agreement was correct, and it
was (T. 158).

Mangelson kept Mr. Becker' s driver' s license in

his pocket (T. 169).
Mangelson asked where they were going and they told him they
were headed to Albuquerque from Los Angeles (T. 157). This made
Mangelson suspicious because the route they were on was not the
most direct route (T. 157).
He testified

that he noticed

a distinct odor of burnt

marijuana immediately upon approaching the open window of the car,
and that shortly after he examined the rental agreement, he
confronted the occupants of the car about the marijuana (T. 158).
He said the marijuana smelled as if it had been used recently,
although he could not tell which occupant of the car had been using
it (T. 177). He asked them if they were using marijuana (T. 159).
Mangelson testified, "They denied any use of it at first.
6

They

seemed a little bit reluctant. I then told them that I could smell
it.

It was obvious.

car was using it.

It was as plain as day that someone in the
At that point and time, Mr. Becker did

acknowledge that they had smoked a joint and made a gesture towards
the ashtray.

There was a roach in the ashtray."

(T. 159).

Mangelson seized two roaches from the ashtray (T. 159-160).

He

asked if there were more drugs in the car, and Mr. Becker told him
they had only the one joint that they had smoked

(T. 160).

Mangelson requested permission to search the car, which Mr. Becker
granted, saying, "Go ahead." (T. 160).

Mangelson

had

them

exit the car, and then he searched the passenger compartment, where
he found a bag of marijuana stuffed in the crack in the back
passenger seat near where Mr. Wilson had been sitting (T. 161).
He asked Lisa La Barrie to open the trunk for him and she did (T.
162).

He strongly suspected there were more drugs in the car, and

when he tore down some carpeting in the trunk, he found a paper bag
which contained a plastic bag containing either methamphetamine or
crack cocaine (T. 162-163).
He asked Lisa, "What is this, and whose is it?"

(T. 163).

She responded that she had no idea, had nothing to do with it, and
did not know anything about it (T. 164). Mr. Becker then went and
got in the driver' s seat of the car and reached to start the car,
but the keys were still in the trunk (T. 164). Mangelson put the
paper bag on top of the car, and when Mr. Becker got out of the
car, Mangelson grabbed him and told him he was under arrest (T.
164).

Mr. Becker broke free, grabbed the paper sack off the roof
7

of the car, and ran (T. 165). Mangelson drew his gun and ordered
Mr. Becker to stop, but Mr. Becker told Mangelson that Mangelson
could not shoot Becker because Becker was unarmed (T. 165). Mr.
Becker ran to a nearby gas station and got into a car and drove
away, despite the car owner' s efforts to intervene by jumping on
the hood of the car (T. 165-166).
The police chased Mr. Becker, and searched for him with a
helicopter and some dogs (T. 169). They never recovered the paper
bag or its contents (T. 168).
The police found the stolen car abandoned the same day, and
Mr. Becker was arrested without incident the next day at a local
convenience store (T. 167-173).
When Mr. Becker was booked in the jail, Mangelson asked him
where he was born, his social security number, and about the sack,
which Mr. Becker denied knowledge of and said did not exist (T.
171-172).
In completing an inventory search of the car, Mangelson found
a cigarette package containing marijuana, and some rolling papers
in a duffle bag in the trunk of the car (T. 172-173).

Lisa La

Barrie claimed the duffle bag as hers (T. 178).
He testified that on marijuana charges, the bail set is the
amount of the fine, and that Ms. La Barrie and Mr. Wilson either
both pled guilty to possession of the marijuana or

forfeited the

bail (T. 180).
Nephi City police officer Bruce Bills confirmed testimony
about the car having been stolen and later recovered, and testified
8

that there was no fingerprint evidence tying Mr. Becker to the
stolen car (T. 209-213).
Bill Thompkins, Juab County Deputy Sheriff, testified that the
day after the traffic stop, someone from the Circle C called in and
reported a bedraggled looking black man in the store, and Thompkins
went in in plain clothes and arrested Mr. Becker (T. 216-220).
Thompkins testified that after he informed Mr. Becker of his
Miranda rights, Mr. Becker told him there were not any drugs, and
if there had been, the police would not have been smart enough to
find them (T. 220). The court explained that the prosecutor had
failed to inform defense counsel of this statement prior to trial,
and that it was therefore stricken (T. 221).
Joseph Walker testified that he met Mr. Becker when Mr. Becker
was in jail on this case, and Mr. Walker was in the jail for
possession of twenty pounds of marijuana and some methamphetamine
in a drug-free zone (T. 236, 241, 247). Walker admitted to having
several felony convictions, possibly four or five, to having been
to prison four times, and to having been convicted of fraud
involving food stamps (T. 237, 247). Walker denied having been
promised anything in exchange for his testimony (T. 240), but
admitted to working as an informant in the past (T. 243). He was
facing a different drug charge at the time of his testimony in this
case (T. 258). He said that Mr. Becker wanted to get a message to
Mr. Becker* s girlfriend,

Lisa La Barrie, that he had not been

found with any drugs (T. 239).

There were witnesses to their

conversation, but he could not recall who they were (T. 260).
9

Bill Thompkins testified that Mr. Walker had been a reliable
informant (T. 265).
DEFENSE CASE
Lisa La Barrie testified that on October 7, 1993, she was
driving the car stopped by Trooper Mangelson, and Mr. Becker and
Michael Wilson were asleep at the time of the stop

(T. 274-275).

Prior to the drive, she had flown to California to visit Michael
Wilson, and then they had Mr. Becker' s girlfriend rent a car for
them to drive back to New Mexico, where La Barrie lived, and where
Mr. Wilson wanted to return to visit Ms. La Barrie' s cousin (T.
293).

Mr. Becker was going along for the ride (T. 294). She had

known Mr. Becker for only a week prior to this incident, and had
very limited contact with him prior to trial (T. 291). At the time
of trial, Mr. Becker drove Ms. La Barrie from the Salt Lake Airport
to court in Nephi, but they did not discuss her upcoming testimony
(T. 315).
On October 7, 1993, she said she was speeding at the rate of
70 miles an hour in a 65 mile an hour zone, and Mangelson stopped
her and asked for her license and registration (T. 276-277).

At

Mangelson' s request, she retrieved her license from the trunk and
had Mr. Becker get the registration information, because the car
was a rental and she did not know where the paperwork was (T. 277).
She testified that she gave Mangelson the keys to the car at his
request after she had retrieved her identification from the trunk,
and that she left the trunk half open (T. 304).
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Mangelson twice told her that he could smell marijuana in the
car, and she twice told him that he could not (T. 278).

She

testified that none of them smoked any marijuana in the car, but
that she had smoked a joint some twenty minutes prior to the stop
outside the car (T. 279, 297).

She told him there was no other

marijuana in the car, although she had some marijuana in the car
under the driver's seat (T. 279-298).

Neither Michael Wilson nor

Mr. Becker possessed any marijuana, but Lisa and Michael had smoked
some outside of the car near a gas station (T. 280). She said that
there were no roaches in the ashtray (T. 281). She told Mangelson
that they had not smoked any in the car (T. 282). Mr. Becker made
no admissions about the marijuana (T. 318).
They were following traveling instructions from Triple A and
Michael had made a wrong turn when he was driving, so they were off
course (T. 294). She said that Mangelson asked where they were
going, and after she told him they were headed to New Mexico, he
asked if they were gang members and said that they looked like they
were when she denied it (T. 282-283). He told her she was a damned
liar and began waving his gun around and ordered them out of the
car (T. 283). On cross-examination, she testified that Mangelson
searched the car while Mr. Becker and Mr. Wilson were still in it,
and it was only after he discussed and found the marijuana that he
began waving his gun around (T. 299-303).

His gun was out for

about five minutes while he was determining whether or not they
were gang members (T. 307).

11

Mangelson asked if he could search the car and she told him,
"Sure."

(T. 283). It was then that Mangelson found her bag of

marijuana under her car seat (T. 284). Mangelson found no paper
sack, and did not ask her about any paper sack (T. 284). She was
aware of no paper sack in the car (T. 285). She testified that he
searched the trunk and found nothing (T. 304). He never told her
she was under arrest (T. 306).
It was after Mangelson then began approaching Mr. Wilson and
Mr. Becker that Mr. Becker ran (T. 285). She testified that Mr.
Becker ran away because Mangelson was pointing his gun at them (T.
309).

After searching the trunk, Mangelson had drawn his gun

again, and was directing Ms.

La Barrie to go sit next to Mr.

Becker and directing Mr. Wilson to walk toward the officer, and
that was when Mr. Becker took off

(T. 309). She saw Mr. Becker

run into an open field, and never saw him steal a car (T. 311).
Mangelson never arrested Mr. Becker or grabbed him, and Mr. Becker
never got in the driver's seat (T. 286). She could not recall Mr.
Becker saying anything when Mangelson drew his gun and ordered him
to stop (T. 287).
Mr. Wilson and she waited at the site of the stop for three to
five minutes, before another officer arrived (T. 288-289).

The

officer who arrived did not cuff them, but directed them to drive
behind him to Nephi, to be processed at the jail, so they did (T.
289-290).
Lisa La Barrie pled guilty to the possession of marijuana
charge, because she was the one who possessed the marijuana (T.
12

290).

She claimed the cigarette package that was in evidence as

hers, but said that Mangelson never found it and never searched her
purse while she was there; she did not see the cigarette package
until she got to the jail (T. 307). She said that there was no
marijuana in her cigarette package, but said that any marijuana
found in the car was hers, and that the rolling papers were hers
(T. 317-318).

Mangelson may have searched her purse again while

she was in jail (T. 320).
She denied ever having received a message from Joseph Walker
from Mr. Becker that the police had found no drugs on Mr. Becker
(T. 291).
STATE1 S REBUTTAL CASE
In rebuttal, Mangelson denied having drawn his gun before Mr.
Becker took off (T. 323). He confirmed Ms. La Barrie's testimony
about having left the scene before another officer arrived to take
custody of Ms. La Barrie and Mr. Wilson, but said that Mr. Wilson
was cuffed before Mangelson left

(T. 323-325).

Charlie Wilson testified in rebuttal that he could not recall
exactly, but it seemed like he retrieved Mr. Wilson, who was
cuffed, and had Ms. La Barrie drive the car into town to the
sheriff's office (T. 329). Mangelson told him, partially over the
radio, about Mr. Becker's having taken off with the sack (T. 3 34).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The voir dire in this case was inadequate because many of the
prospective jurors were involved in personal relationships with the
13

prosecutor and witnesses for the State.

The trial court did not

conduct an adequate voir dire to rebut the inference of bias
attaching to these prospective jurors, and two of the jurors served
in Mr. Becker* s case. Another juror who served was not questioned
adequately to rebut an inference of bias attaching to him as a
result of his step-daughter' s conviction for a drug offense. Mr.
Becker is entitled to a new, fair trial.
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Becker' s motion to
suppress the evidence.

Prior to locating

any

incriminating

evidence, Trooper Mangelson conducted a custodial interrogation
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Mr. Becker should have a
new trial where all evidence derived from the interrogation is
suppressed.
The trial court should have given the jurors Mr. Becker' s
requested lesser included offense instruction.

The charged and

lesser offense include overlapping elements, and the evidence
provided a rational basis for acquitting Mr. Becker of the auto
theft charge and convicting him of class A misdemeanor joyriding.
The trial court should have excluded evidence regarding
Trooper Mangelson' s speculations about what was in the paper bag
that Mr. Becker took with him when he left the scene of the traffic
stop. The contents of the bag were not relevant to any issue, and
the admission of the speculation and the prosecutor' s argument
about it may well have unfairly prejudiced the jury.

14

ARGUMENT
I.
THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
A. Facts of this case
During the voir dire, several of the jurors indicated their
acquaintances with the prosecutor and witnesses for the state. Ms.
Wilson was the Nephi City Treasurer, and had worked with the
prosecutor and the police officers, but said she did not socialize
with them and would be not be prejudiced as a result of that
acquaintance (T. 69-70).

Mr. Hall, the County Health Inspector,

had worked with the prosecutor

and been represented

by him

personally in the past, and knew the police officers, but said he
socialized with them "very little" (T. 71). He indicated that he
would not be prejudiced against either party as a result of his
dealings with the prosecutor, but was not asked about how his
relationship with the officers would influence his performance (T.
71).

Ms. Whittington knew all the police and the attorneys as

casual acquaintances and in her employment for a bank, but said
that she did not socialize with them and said she would be unbiased
(T. 73-74).

Mr. Connor was familiar with the prosecutor because

the prosecutor had done some legal work for Mr. Connor three months
prior to the trial, but Mr. Connor said that the transaction was
complete and he would not be prejudiced against either party (T.
71-72).

Mr. Wankier knew the police and spoke with them when he

saw them, but did not socialize with them, and said he would be
unbiased

(T. 75).

Mr. Newell knew the prosecutor, Trooper
15

Mangelson, and other police officers, and said that he "had a
pretty good regard for them"

when he was their high school

principal, but said he would be unbiased

(T. 75-76). Mr. Reed had

been represented by the prosecutor before and was working with him
in the scouting program at the time of trial, was familiar with the
police.

While he said he would not be influenced by his dealings

with the prosecutor, he was not asked about any influence that his
relationships with the police might have on his performance (T. 7678).

Ms. Jensen worked with the prosecutor and knew the police

officers, and said she would be unbiased by her relationship with
the prosecutor, but was not asked about how her relationship with
the police might influence her (T. 78-79).
The trial court gave the defense the opportunity to ask
supplemental voir dire questions, but Mr. Means did not inquire
further about the jurors' relationships with the officers (T. 107111).
When the time came to make challenges for cause, Mr. Means
indicated on the record outside the presence of the prospective
jurors, "Also it goes without saying that the fact that a number of
these jurors know one or more of these officers is not going to be
grounds for cause because of the practicality of it. It is a small
town and they are going to run into these people from time to
time."

When the court indicated, "Well, the fact that they know

them, I don't think is grounds for cause any where," Mr. Means
stated that he understood.

(T. 129).

Mr. Means asked the

prosecutor if he knew if the jurors' relationships with the police
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went beyond mere casual recognition, and the trial court indicated
that the prosecutor could answer if he knew, but that the jurors
were the best sources of that information (T. 130). The prosecutor
indicated that the police officers were from Levan, the court noted
that some of the prospective jurors were from Levan, and no
additional voir dire was requested or conducted on this topic (T.
130).
In response to the court1 s question about whether any of the
panelists had been victims of crimes, or had victims of crimes in
their families, Clyde Elmer stated, "I have a step daughter that
was a victim of drugs. ... She was put on trial and sentenced." (T.
94). After establishing that she had been tried locally, the court
followed up with this inquiry:
Is there any bias or prejudice created for or
against either party as a result of that experience?
No.
Could you fairly and impartially try this case based
on the testimony and evidence that you would hear in the
courtroom?
Yes, I believe I could.
(T. 95). Mr. Means did not request further voir dire of Mr. Elmer
on this issue.
Mr. Means challenged several jurors for cause on the basis of
their relationships with the prosecutor (T. 113-128).

The trial

court denied the challenge for cause of juror Connor, which was
based on his having hired the prosecutor to do legal work on his
grandmother' s estate three months prior to this trial (T. 116, 122,
128).

Mr. Means did not challenge for cause Mr. Elmer or Mr.

Newell.
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After the challenges for cause, Mr. Means passed the jury for
cause (T. 131).
Mr. Newell, Mr. Connor and Mr. Elmer served on the jury (T.
131) .
B. Applicable law
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire proceedings.
E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
1988) (citing Article

I, sections

439, 448 and nn. 1-6
7, 10 and

(Utah

12 of the Utah

constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution), reversed on other grounds, State v. Menzies,
889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has exercised its
supervisory power to reiterate to the trial courts of this state
that

it

is

their

responsibility

to

insure

that

voir

dire

proceedings not only provide adequate information for the informed
exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate bias and
prejudice from criminal trials. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797798 (Utah 1991).

In James, the court directed the trial courts to

go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire required by federal
constitutional standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror
biases to the best of their ability. Id. Utah's allegiance to the
need for thorough voir dire in criminal cases has been strong and
consistent.

E.g. State v. Worthenf 765 P. 2d 839, 844-45 (Utah

1988); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 1984).
n

[T]he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel

to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and
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biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would
not have supported a challenge for cause.' All that is necessary
for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow
'defense

counsel

intelligently.'11

to

exercise

peremptory

challenges

more

State v. Worthen. 765 P. 2d 839, 845 (Utah

1988)(citation omitted).
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the right to an
impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14)
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are
adequate to reveal juror bias.

The rule provides that a juror

should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a
state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging[.]"
Utah law recognizes that when jurors have relationships with
witnesses or attorneys in the case, they cannot serve impartially.
State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 800-803 (Utah 1977); Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 18(e)(4) (authorizing a challenge for cause for
"the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness
or person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the
defendant, which

relationship

when viewed

objectively, would

suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism.");

Utah

Rule

of

Criminal
19

Procedure

18(e)(14)

(authorizing a challenge for cause if

"a state of mind exists on

the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging[.]").
Even if such jurors claim the ability to serve impartially, a court
commits reversible error in failing to grant a challenge for cause
of such jurors in the absence of an adequate voir dire.

Id.

See

also State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 658-661 (Utah App. 1992) (inference
of bias attaches to jurors involved with attorney and witnesses,
which the trial court must rebut with meaningful voir dire, or
excuse the jurors for cause).
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not simply
accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a case
fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about the
juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial court to
ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears latent biases
which would impair the juror's performance. See State v. Woolley,
810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar
to that at issue in the case, an inference of bias arises, which is
not rebutted by a juror's claim that he can be fair and impartial).
See also State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987); State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah
1981); State v. Cox, supra.

As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty,

824 P.2d 460 (Utah App, 1991),

lf

[I]t is not enough for a trial
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judge to ask questions merely to discover a potential juror's overt
biases. The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear
responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling
a fair and impartial jury is diminished."

Id. at 462.

In the instant case, the trial court should have granted Mr.
Means' challenge for cause of juror Connor, who had hired the
prosecutor to do some legal work for him three months prior to this
trial. The voir dire was inadequate to rebut the inference of bias
arising from their relationship.

E.g. Cox, supra.

Trial counsel

should have challenged for cause or requested further voir dire of
juror Newell, who held the prosecutor and police officers who
testified against Mr. Becker in high regard as a result of their
relationship with him.

Id.

Trial counsel should have challenged

for cause or requested additional voir dire of juror Elmer, whose
step-daughter had been convicted of a drug offense, and who
characterized his step-daughter as a "victim1' . Woolley. The trial
court had the responsibility to conduct an adequate voir dire of
these jurors, and in the absence of record proof rebutting the
inference of bias attaching to these jurors, the trial court should
have removed them for cause. E.g. Cox; Woolley. The trial court' s
perfunctory questions to the jurors concerning the jurors' ability
to try the case without prejudice to either party were inadequate
to rebut the inference of prejudice attaching to the jurors. Id.
The trial court' s failure to grant the challenge for cause of
juror Connor is an adequate basis for reversing Mr. Becker' s
21

conviction. Cox. Should this Court wish to address the remaining
voir dire errors, the Court may do so on the basis of the plain
error or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.

See e.g.

State v. Ellifritzr 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992)(discussing both
doctrines in the context of jury voir dire).

The record does not

indicate that Mr. Means made a tactical decision to seat jurors
Elmer and Newell, and there could be no valid reason for seating
these jurors in the absence of an adequate investigation of the
inference of bias attaching to them.
a prospective

Mr. Means' indication that

juror1 s knowing a witness would not support a

challenge for cause because the trial was being held in a small
town where people were prone to know one another (T. 129-130), and
Mr. Means' willingness to rely on the prosecutor to provide
information about the jurors' relationships with the police even
after the trial court stated that the jurors were the proper source
of that information (T. 130), demonstrate that Mr. Means was
unfamiliar with the law governing the issue, and was not acting
within the bounds of reasonable performance.

The errors involved

should have been plain to the trial court. Because of the service
of three jurors who were presumptively prejudiced, a new trial is
in order.

E.g. Cox.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

A. Facts of this case
Relying on the federal and state constitutions, Mr. Means
moved to suppress all evidence stemming from the warrantless search
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of the car (R. 170-171).

At the hearing on the motion, Officer

Mangelson was the only witness who testified.
He indicated that on October 7, 1993, at about 11:30 a.m., he
came into contact with Mr. Becker during a traffic stop, which
involved speeding at the radar-detected rate of 76 miles an hour in
a 65 mile an hour zone (T. 17-18).

As the vehicle came to a stop,

Mr. Becker and Mr. Wilson, the two passengers, who had been
sleeping, sat up (T. 18).

Mangelson told the driver, Lisa La

Barrie, why he had stopped the car and asked for her license and
registration (T. 19). She told him that her license was in her
purse in the trunk, and she got out and retrieved it (T. 19).
Rather than producing the registration, she produced a rental
agreement for the car, and he noted that the listed renter was not
in the car (T. 19).

When he asked Ms. La Barrie about this, she

told him that the renter had rented the car because she had a
credit card, and that Mr. Becker was listed as an authorized
driver, which he was (T. 20).
passenger seat (T. 20).

Mr. Becker was in the front

Mangelson asked Mr. Becker for his

identification, which he produced (T. 48). Mr. Becker's license
was in order, but Mangelson held it (T. 47-48).

Mangelson could

not recall when he got identification from the other passenger (T.
48).

The driver was properly licensed and the car's registration

was proper (T. 43). Mangelson considered them to be in violation
of the rental agreement because Lisa La Barrie was not listed as a
driver (T. 44). He did not feel that the rental agreement was any
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reason to stop the car, and their possession of the car was proper
(T. 44).
At some point, Mangelson asked them where they were headed,
and Lisa La Barrie told him they were headed to Albuquerque, on the
route recommended by an auto club.

Mangelson was suspicious

because they were not on the correct route (T. 45).
At some point in time, Mangelson detected the smell of burnt
marijuana coming from the car, and he asked all three of the car
occupants about it (T. 20).

He testified that he smelled the

marijuana immediately upon approaching the car, when the driver
opened her window (T. 43). He indicated that all three of them
were quite hesitant, but that Mr. Becker told him that they had
smoked one joint, but that that was all the marijuana that they had
(T. 20). Mangelson testified that Mr. Becker "referred to the ash
tray," where there was a joint, which Mangelson retrieved at that
point (T. 21). Later, Mangelson testified, "I asked them if they
were using it. They said that they were not.
smell it as plain as day.

I know that you are using it. Then Mr.

Becker said that yes we did.
the ash tray."

I said that I can

We smoked a joint.

He referred to

(T. 46). There were no Miranda warnings given (T.

47).
Mangelson then asked if there was more marijuana in the car,
and they told him there was not (T. 21). He asked if he could look
through the car, and Mr. Becker told him, "Go ahead."

(T. 22).

Mangelson had everyone exit the car and he searched them for
weapons and told them to stand in an area where he could see them
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(T. 22). He first searched the car interior, where he found a bag
of marijuana stuffed in the seat where Mr. Wilson had been sitting
(T. 22).

Then he had the driver open the trunk of the car. He

testified, "I then asked the driver to open the trunk for me and
she got the keys. As she retrieved the keys from the ignition she
looked at Mr. Becker and you could tell she had a real sick look on
her face, that she really didnp t want to open the trunk but she did
comply."

(T. 23).

Mangelson searched through the trunk and

underneath the carpeting, he found a paper sack containing a
plastic bag containing a half a pound to a pound of an off-white
rocky substance that he knew was cocaine or methamphetamine (T. 24,
26).

Mangelson also found a gun in Lisa La Barrie' s bag (T. 36).
There was no evidence presented concerning the impound and

inventory policy governing Trooper Mangelson' s search.
Prior to the argument of counsel on the motion to suppress,
the trial court indicated that the traffic stop was valid, and that
Trooper Mangelson's seizure of the roaches gave him "absolutely
complete articulable suspicion

in this case to continue the

search," which was also bolstered by Mr. Becker' s permission to
search (T. 54-55).
Mr. Means responded that the purported consent by Mr. Becker
was only for the passenger compartment and did not extend to the
trunk of the car (T. 55). He argued under State v. Mirquetf 844
P.2d 995 (Utah App.), affirmed, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995),
that because Mangelson failed to give Mr. Becker his Miranda
warnings prior to accusing him of smoking the marijuana, all
25

evidence seized thereafter should be suppressed (T. 55-56).
prosecutor responded,
To respond to this, this case is different than
[Mirquet]. In [Mirquet]f the officer, Sergeant Mangelson
stated that I can smell Marijuana, go get the marijuana.
Mr. [Mirquet] went and got the Marijuana. That is not
the case in this case.
Mr. Becker merely said that we have been smoking
Marijuana and made some reference to the ashtray. The
officer retrieved the evidence.
He then asked for
consent and that was not the case in [Mirquet]. There
was no consent given.
The officer in this case went and got consent and
then went and found additional Marijuana within the
passenger compartment. Clearly, that consent was never
withdrawn.
He clearly still had sufficient probable
cause even without consent to make a search of the trunk.
If he found marijuana in one particular part of the
vehicle he has clear additional probable cause to make
additional searches.
He is going to make a custodial
arrest of these individuals anyway. There is going to be
an inventory search to boot.
Further with respect to the [Mirquet] Case, it is
still our position that the Court of Appeals is wrong and
the Supreme Court has granted Cert on that case and is
presently before them, the Supreme Court, for the final
decision as to that issue.
(T. 57-58).

Defense counsel responded,

If you had found, your Honor, that Mr. Becker had given
consent and the Miranda Warnings are not necessary and he
freely gave consent then you also need to find whether or
not that consent was attenuated from his previous seizure
and the questioning of him by the officer. Again, if the
officer had seized the Marijuana illegally, because in my
opinion the reference that Mr. Becker made to the
marijuana should not have been admitted into evidence.
Then beyond that point any search just because
Marijuana is found in one part of the car legally,
doesn' t allow a search of the rest of the car. It might
provide for probable cause but it doesn' t provide the
authority to search further. It provides a basis for a
search warrant. The consent of Mr. Becker should be
attenuated from the previous seizure of that Marijuana
Cigarette in the ashtray if it was not seized properly.
The point of the testimony that no time passed for Mr.
Becker to seek counsel to consider his responses and all
of the factors that are necessary in an attenuation.
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The

(T. 58-59).

The prosecutor disagreed, stating,

Your Honor, the attenuation would only come into
play if there had been a legal search. There wasn' t any
legal search.
The officer, based upon the odor of
Marijuana, had probable cause without consent to make a
search anyway. Since this was a highway stop and was not
probable cause to obtain a search warrant, is probable
cause to make a warrantless search. This is a highway
stop and the automotive exception of the warrant
requirement comes into play.
(T. 59). The trial court ruled,
I agree. I will making the finding that in this
particular case, Mr. Means, where the officer smelled the
Marijuana. The defendant admitted to having smoked the
Marijuana.
The officer asked for a search of the
vehicle. He searched the compartment and found Marijuana
in the backseat as I recall stuffed under the backseat
the bag of Marijuana, and this is sufficient evidence to
continue the search into the trunk of the vehicle where
he discovered the other evidence.
Your motion to suppress is denied on all counts.
(T. 59-60).
B. Applicable law
As Mr. Means argued, State v. Mirquet, 844 P. 2d 995 (Utah
App.), affirmed, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), controls this
case.

Mr. Mirquet was stopped by Trooper Mangelson for speeding,

and while Mirquet was in Mangelson' s patrol car to see the radar
reading, Mangelson

smelled burnt marijuana and stated, "It's

obvious to me you' ve been smoking marijuana. Do you care to go get
the marijuana for me, or do you want me to find it?"
went and retrieved two joints from his car.

Mr. Mirquet

844 P.2d at 996.

Mangelson then went and searched the passenger compartment of the
car, finding more drugs and paraphernalia, and searched the trunk
of the car, where he found more drugs. Id. On appeal, this Court
and the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Trooper
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Mangelson owed Mr. Mirquet a Miranda warning prior to inquiring
about the marijuana, and that all evidence seized after the
interrogation was properly suppressed.

844 P.2d at 997-1001; 268

Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4.
Similarly, in the instant case, the occupants of the car
should have been given Miranda warnings prior to Mangelson' s having
told them it was "plain as day" that they were smoking marijuana,
and pressured them to confess.

At the time of these comments,

Mangelson had stopped their car by the side of the interstate and
seized their identification. See State v. Shoulderblade, 276 Utah
Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah 1995)(" Shoulderblade was not free to leave.
His license had not been returned.").

His investigation was

focused solely on the occupants of the car.

The same indicia of

arrest were present here as were present in Mirquet.

The "length

and form of the interrogation evidenced a coercive intent on the
part of the officer which significantly bore on the ultimate
question."

Mirquet, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4.

See also State v.

Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 998 (questioning shifts from investigatory to
accusatory when

ut

police have reasonable grounds to believe that a

crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe
that the defendant has committed it.")(citations omitted).
Any reasonable person in Mr. Becker' s circumstances would have
reasonably believed at the time that "his freedom of action was
curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest."
844 P.2d at 997.

Mirquetr

Because Mangelson failed to inform Mr. Becker of

his Miranda rights prior to this custodial interrogation, all
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evidence

flowing

from

the

interrogation

should

have

been

suppressed.
Mr. Means was correct in arguing that Mangelson' s finding
marijuana in the car may have provided probable cause to obtain a
search warrant, but did not justify a search of the entire car.1
Under Utah law, in order to perform a warrantless automobile
search, an officer would have to have both probable cause and
exigent circumstances, which were not present in this case.

See

e.g. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990)(plurality).
See also State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 973 n.7 (Utah App.
1992)(indicating that under Utah law, in contrast to the federal,
it appears that an officer' s detection of the smell of marijuana
does not dispense with the exigent circumstance showing needed to
justify a warrantless search); State v. Dudleyr 847 P.2d 424, 426

1

Mr. Means' written motion to suppress alleged
violations of both the state and federal constitutions, and
called upon the state to meet its burden to justify the
warrantless search of the car ( R. 169-171). At the hearing on
the motion to suppress, Mr. Means argued that the smell of
marijuana may have provided probable cause to obtain a warrant,
but did not provide authority to search without a warrant (T.
59).. This argument was consistent with Utah State Constitutional
law, such as Larocco.
In the event that the Court feels that Mr. Means'
articulation of the argument before the trial court was somehow
wanting, this Court should nonetheless address the state
constitutional argument on appeal, and may do so under either the
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.
Larocco, Dudley, and Naisbitt were all decided and published
prior to the disposition of Mr. Becker' s motion to suppress.
Trial counsel and the trial court should both have been aware of
and applying this law, and any failure to do so would clearly
have prejudiced Mr. Becker. See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818,
822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on
allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel), cert, grantedr 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
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n.2 (Utah App. 1993)(same).

But see State v. Spurcreon, 274 Utah

Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 1995)(under federal decisions, Mangelson had
probable cause to search an entire car, including the trunk of the
car, based on his smell of burnt marijuana and other factors).
Exclusion is the only result from a violation of Article I section
14 of the Utah Constitution.

E.g. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472-73

(plurality).
Where the marijuana in this case was seized illegally, the
consent

obtained

thereafter

was

no

consent

unless

it

was

sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure. The consent and
searches followed immediately on the heels of the seizure of the
roaches, and there were no intervening facts to show that the
consent was not the product of the illegal interrogation and
seizure.

See State v. Shoulderblade. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah

1995)(discussing need to prove attenuation of consent from illegal
searches and seizures); State v. Zieglemanr 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 56
(Utah App. 1995)(same).
While the prosecutor and trial court apparently believed that
the finding of the marijuana in the ashtray justified a search of
the entire car, including the trunk of the car, there was no
evidence presented concerning the impound and inventory policy
governing the search, or indicating that Trooper Mangelson had
placed the parties under arrest at the time of the search.
Perhaps more importantly, the prosecutor and trial court failed to
appreciate the fact that the marijuana was found through the
violation of Mr. Becker' s rights under Miranda, and like the
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derivative evidence in Mirquet, the derivative evidence in this
case should have been suppressed.
While it appears that the facts of this case demonstrate
actual coercion on Mangelson' s part, because the State did not
argue to the trial court that the physical evidence should not be
suppressed absent proof of actual coercion, this Court should not
entertain

such an argument on appeal, but should hold that

suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy.

See

Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 1001 (court declined to address state's
argument raised for the first time on appeal that absent actual
coercion, physical evidence derived through a Miranda violation
should not be suppressed); affirmed, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE REQUESTED LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION.
A. Facts of this case
Mr. Means requested a lesser included offense instruction on
the offense of joy-riding, a class A misdemeanor (R. 120), which
stated,
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I,
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you may find the
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle, a class "A"
misdemeanor, if you find the following:
-The Defendant;
-On or about 7 October, 1993;
-In Juab County, State of Utah;
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle;
-not his own;
-without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian;
-with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or
lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle.
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(R. 120). The court only gave a third degree felony joyriding
instruction, which stated,
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I,
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you my find the
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle for an Extended
Period of Time, a Third Degree Felony, if you find the
following:
-The Defendant;
-On or about 7 October, 1993;
-In Juab County, State of Utah;
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle;
-And did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or
lawful custodian
-within 24 hours of the exercise of unlawful control.
(R. 212). Mr. Means objected to the trial court' s failure to give
the class A misdemeanor instruction (T. 340).
B. Applicable law
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court explained why due process of law requires a trial court to
give a defendant' s requested lesser included offense instruction if
the evidence warrants the instruction; the lesser included offense
instruction gives the defendant the full benefit of the beyond a
reasonable

doubt

standard

of

proof

by

giving

the

jury

an

alternative between convicting the defendant of a more serious
charge of which he is not guilty and acquitting him.
157.

Id. at 156-

In determining whether it is necessary to instruct on a

lesser included offense, the trial court must first determine that
there is some overlap in the elements of the charged offense and
the lesser offense.

Id. at 158-159.

If there is some overlap in

the legal elements, the trial court must assess the evidence to
determine that there is a

ai

a

rational basis for a verdict

acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him

of the included offense.' " Id. at 159, quoting Utah Code Ann. §761-402.

In making this assessment, courts are not to weigh the

credibility of the evidence, but should give the lesser included
offense instruction if there is evidence to raise a jury question.
Id.

See also State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980)(court

must give lesser included offense instruction on the defendant' s
request if there is any evidence however slight on any reasonable
theory of the case to justify it).

If there is statutory overlap

in the elements and a reasonable basis for acquitting of the
charged offense and convicting of the lesser offense, the trial
court has no discretion to refuse to give the lesser included
offense instruction.

State v. Simpsonf 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 45

(Utah App. 1995).
The statutory elements of theft and class A misdemeanor
joyriding overlap. Theft is defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 766-404 as follows: "A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive him thereof."2

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-

1311 defines class A joyriding as follows: "It is a class A
2

Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401(3) provides,
M
Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
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misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control over a
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of the motor
vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer."

Because both offenses involve

the proof of one' s exercising unauthorized

control over the

property of another, the first portion of the Baker test is met.
See

State

v.

Simpsonf

274

Utah

Adv.

Rep.

46

(Utah

App.

1995)(statutory overlap is established if the same facts prove
elements of two offenses).
There was a basis in the evidence for acquitting Mr. Becker of
the theft charge because the evidence suggests that he did not have
the "purpose to deprive" the owner of her car. Because he clearly
exercised unauthorized control over the car without her consent and
with the intent to temporarily deprive her of her car, there was
certainly a basis for convicting him of the class A misdemeanor.
See Simpson at 47 (lesser included offense instruction should go to
the jury if there is evidence to establish a jury question as to
acquittal of the charged offense and conviction of the lesser).
While the trial court gave the jury the lesser included
offense instruction for a third degree felony joyriding conviction,
this did not obviate the trial court' s responsibility to give the
class A misdemeanor instruction under Baker.
Jones, 878 P. 2d 1175

See e.g. State v.

(Utah App. 1994)(conviction

for lesser

included offense reversed because trial court refused to give
instruction on different lesser included offense, as requested by
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the defense).
option

to

Assuming arguendo that the trial court had the

choose

between

requested

lesser

included

offense

instructions, the trial court made the wrong choice in giving the
jury the option of the third degree felony joyriding.

This is so

because it appears that the car was recovered the same day it was
stolen —

Trooper Mangelson testified that he recovered the car

shortly after the chase of Mr. Becker began (T. 167).

In these

circumstances, the jury may have felt that it was inappropriate to
convict Mr. Becker of an offense which contained an element that
the defendant failed to return the car within 24 hours.3 The class
A misdemeanor instruction would have been more appropriate, because
it contained an element of intent to temporarily deprive the owner,
without specifying the length of time involved.
In any event, the class A misdemeanor instruction met both
prongs of the Baker test, and the trial court committed reversible
error in failing to give it. Id.

3

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1314 defines the third
degree felony offense as follows:
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer if the person does not return the motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of
unauthorized control.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of
a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to its control
by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner' s or legal custodian' s consent on
a previous occasion to the control of the motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a
different person.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF
THE PAPER BAG.
A. Facts of this case
Mr. Means submitted a motion in limine seeking to exclude,
under Utah Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, evidence concerning
Trooper Mangelson' s speculations concerning the contents of the
brown bag taken by Mr. Becker (R. 127-128).

In arguing the

motion, Mr. Means contended,
My argument then and my argument now well, this officer
has got considerable time on the road and I think he said
27 years and I respect that. He has had training as an
officer and drug interdiction on that and to make
reference to the exact chemical composition or exactly
what the substance was in the bag calls for expertise
that he doesn' t have.
Also, I don' t believe that it is relevant to know
what necessarily was in that bag either for purposes of
the Suppression Hearing or the trial. Mr. Becker is
charged with the destruction of evidence that I argued at
the Pre-trial, pre-trial management hearing when the
motion was considered, the Motion in Limine was
considered. I don' t think that it matters whether the
bag was empty or full of candy or full of Crack Cocaine.
All the State needs to do to carry its burden on that
issue is to establish that Mr. Becker absconded with the
evidence, that is my guess as to their theory of the case
regardless of what it might be even if the bag were
empty. So I don' t think it is important either for the
Suppression Hearing or for the trial that he be allowed
to give you an opinion as to what the substance might
have been.
(T. 24-25).

The prosecutor argued that Mangelson was qualified to

identify the substance, and that its identity gave him a basis for
further investigation (T. 25). After requiring the prosecutor to
lay further foundation on Trooper Mangelson' s ability to identify
the contents of the bag, the court denied the motion to suppress
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the trooper' s speculation on the contents of the bag (T. 25; R.
162) .
Trooper Mangelson testified that he believed that the bag
contained crack cocaine or methamphetamine, and that if Mr. Becker
had not run off with the paper bag, the occupants of the car would
have

been

subject to

federal

prosecutions

involving

minimum

mandatory sentences for possession with intent to distribute (T.
200).

Mr. Means established that this was somewhat speculative

testimony, given that Mangelson did not know what was in the bag
(T. 204). In closing argument, the prosecutor stated,
I mean, you know, it doesn' t take a bright person to
think to know this is evidence. That this is evidence of
a crime of unlawful possession of a controlled
substances. A very serious offense, given the quantity
and the nature of this particular controlled substances.
Sergeant Mangelson knowing that it is evidence,
takes it and puts it on top of the car while he is trying
to restrain and arrest Mr. Becker. Mr. Becker breaks
through and gets lose and he takes that and Sergeant
Mangelson sees him with it all the way to the point where
he steals the car.
That bag is never recovered.
Clearly, Mr. Becker, his actions are such that it
impairs the availability of that evidence for the
official proceedings or investigation.
You know Mr. Becker has already beat the system if
you want to look at it that way. He has accomplished
what he intended to accomplish. He has avoided the much
more serious crime that he would have been charged with
if the officer had been able to retain that evidence, but
he should not get away with the consequences of this
crime that being tampering with evidence.
(T. 353-54).
B. Applicable law
In

traditional

drug

cases,

the

state

must

present

toxicological analysis of a controlled substance to establish what
it is.

See generally State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah
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1989)(under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, expert may testify about
scientific matters if scientific principles and techniques are
reliable).

Assuming arguendo that Mangelson was qualified to

speculate as to the contents of the paper bag, his speculation
should nonetheless have been excluded because it was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides for the admission of "[a] 11
relevant evidence

.. .

except as otherwise provided by the

Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable
in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is defined by Utah
Rule of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."

Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides,

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Utah law interpreting these rules demonstrates the error of
admitting the evidence concerning the contents of the bag..
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, courts are to presume that
relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence at issue falls
within a class of evidence known to have "an unusual propensity to
unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead the jury."

State v. Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). In the event that the evidence
fell within such a class, the proponent of the evidence would then
38

have the burden to show the unusual probative value of the
evidence.

Id.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is considered to be presumptively
prejudicial, State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985), and
under Dunn, it was the prosecutor1 s duty to establish the unusual
probative value of the evidence, assuming that the evidence was
even relevant.
The prosecutor argued that the evidence was essential to show
a basis for the trooper's continuing

investigation

(T. 25).

Particularly in the jury trial, there was no need to establish any
basis for the trooper' s continuing investigation.

As Mr. Means

argued, the contents of the bag were neither relevant nor necessary
to the prosecution of the tampering with the evidence charge.4
Because the State did not establish an unusual probative value for
the evidence, and because it was presumptively prejudicial, the
trial court should have excluded the evidence. Dunn.
The State' s case against Mr. Becker on the evidence tampering
charge was directly contradicted by the defense case.

Mangelson

testified that Mr. Becker ran off with a paper bag containing crack
4

Tampering with evidence is defined by Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-8-510 as follows:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to impair its
verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything
which he knows to be false with a purpose to
deceive a public servant who is or may be
engaged in a proceeding or investigation.
39

cocaine or methamphetamine, while Lisa La Barrie testified that
there was no bag found by Mangelson or taken by Mr. Becker.
Particularly given the prosecutor' s closing argument, wherein he
told the jury that Mr. Becker had already "beat the system" by
taking the drugs and avoiding the more serious drug charge, and
urged the jury to see to it that he was held accountable for the
charge before the jury, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury was improperly influenced to convict Mr. Becker of the
evidence tampering charge.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Becker requests a new trial, wherein the voir dire is
adequate, improper evidence is excluded, and the jury is instructed
properly.
Respectfully submitted this

day of

CPM her

,

1995.
DOUGLAS L. N E E L E Y / T
Attorney for Mr. Becker-'
Becke
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I shall cause to be served eight copies
of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals and two copies of the
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office,r236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this /£*• day ,of {Jrrftoilot/'
, 1995.

>(
DOUG3LAJ5 L. NEELE;Y
Drney for Mr. BeckgjAttorney
Delivered/ mailed .eagles
.pojg^es of tnia
thj^ brief,
brief/ to the Attorney
3
General's Office this rv/7- ^ day of < - C f m ^ i ^ M s —
1995.

^yjtf^^n^
40

rS^

Appendix 1
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions

Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction,
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
. preliminary examination, the function of the
examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1311
It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to
exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful
custodian of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1314
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer if the person does not return the motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of
unauthorized control.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of
a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to its control
by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner' s or legal custodian' s consent on
a previous occasion to the control of the motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a
different person.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-402
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code,
the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any
other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the
jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be
convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or
an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the

jury with respect to an included offense unless there
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of
the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and
a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including
real estate, tangible and intangible personal property,
captured or domestic animals and birds, written
instruments or other writings representing or embodying
rights concerning real or personal property, labor,
services, or otherwise containing anything of value to
the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or
water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any
portion of any scientific or technical information,
design, process, procedure, formula or invention which
the owner thereof intends to be available only to
persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to
bring about a transfer of possession or of some other
legally recognized interest in property, whether to the
obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services,
to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a
trade secret to make any facsimile, replica,
photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control"
means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct

heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by
trespassory taking, larceny be conversion, larceny by
bailee, and embezzlement•
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of law or fact that is
false and that the actor does not believe to
be true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression
of law or fact that the actor previously
created or confirmed by words or conduct that
is likely to affect the judgment of another
and that the actor does not now believe to be
true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring
information likely to affect his judgment in
the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or
encumbers property without disclosing a lien,
security interest, adverse claim, or other
legal impediment to the enjoyment of the
property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim or impediment is or is not
valid or is or is not a matter of official
record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely
to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor does
not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed; provided, however, that failure to
perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not
intend to perform or knew the promise would
not be performed.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with
a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by
counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed
against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;

(e) To have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district where the offense is alleged
to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if
the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when
received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has ben
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by
a magistrate.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus
such an additional number as will allow for all
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made,
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause.
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
thereon is peremptory challenge to one juror at a time
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury,
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the
jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or
may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as
it deems proper, or may itself submit to the

prospective jurors additional questions requested by
counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an
individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called
to serve at a particular court or for the
trial of a particular action. A challenge to
the panel is an objection made to all jurors
summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel
can be founded only on a material
departure from the procedure
prescribed with respect to the
selection, drawing, summoning and
return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the
panel shall be taken before the
jury is sworn and shall be in
writing or recorded by the
reporter. It shall specifically
set forth the facts constituting
the grounds of the challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the
panel is opposed by the adverse
party, a hearing may be had to try
any question of fact upon which the
challenge is based. The jurors
challenged, and any other persons,
may be called as witnesses at the
hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide
the challenge. If the challenge to
the panel is allowed, the court
shall discharge the jury so far as
the trial in question is concerned.
If a challenge is denied, the court
shall direct the selection of the
jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror
may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made
only before the jury is sworn to try the
action, except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn
but before any of the evidence is presented.
In challenges for cause the rules relating to
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon
shall apply. All challenges for cause shall
be taken first by the prosecution and then by
the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a
juror for which no reason need be given. In capital
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled

to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases,
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges.
If there is more than one defendant the court may allow
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(1) want of any of the
qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity
which renders one incapable of performing the
duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree to the person alleged to be
injured by the offense charged, or on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any party,
witness or person alleged to have been
victimized or injured by the defendant, which
relationship when viewed objectively, would
suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be
free of favoritism. A prospective juror
shall not be disqualified solely because he
is indebted or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party
adverse to the defendant in a civil action,
or having complained against or having been
accused by him in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the particular
offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally
sworn to try the same charge, and whose
verdict was set aside, or which was
discharged without a verdict after the case
was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil
action brought against the defendant for the
act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is
punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death
penalty as would preclude the juror from
voting to impose the death penalty following
conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one yea,r

preceding, has been engaged or interested in
carrying on any business, calling or
employment, the carrying on of which is a
violation of law, where defendant is charged
with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness,
either for or against the defendant on the
preliminary examination or before the grand
jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged;
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
(f) peremptory challenges shall be taken first by
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately.
Challenges for cause shall be completed before
peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
The prosecution and defense shall each have one
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate
juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same
privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror
is a privilege of the person exempted and is not a
ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and
each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict
according to the evidence and the instructions of the
court.
Utah Rule of Evidence 401

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having nay
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than in would be without the
evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 702
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.

